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On Human Rights and Majority
Politics
Felix Frankfurter'sDemocratic Theory
Samuel Moyn*
ABSTRACT

This symposium piece is primarily a reading of Felix
Frankfurter'sdissent in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, attempting to draw some lessons from his theory of
majoritarianrights for our own moment of crisis for the human
rights movement. The situations then and now are only partly
comparable, but Frankfurter's call for allowing democratic
processes to self-correct even when elite shortcuts beckonincluding when it comes to defining and protecting rightsprovides food for thought.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In September 1937, the U.S. Constitution's 150th anniversary
was celebrated. It was a moment when the American people-through
their election of the Democratic party to power in the two political
branches of government-empowered their president to place the
interests of a popular majority above a minority's rights claims.
Though the court-packing scheme of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR)
that year had failed in achieving its goal of expanding the Supreme
Court's membership, the popular majority triumphed indirectly after
the court's existing membership deferred to its will. Roosevelt's speech
in honor of the Constitution was in fact a defense of majoritarian
politics retroactively, after what he considered to be an illegitimate
minority was put in its place. Roosevelt hardly rejected human rights.
But he insisted that, if defended and pursued in a new way, they could
become safe for majority rule, and vice versa.
Human rights were important, but not more so than majority rule,
especially since minority protections had been the way of the world,
and majority rule had almost never been achieved in practice. For this
reason, Roosevelt's central premise was that majority rule should
sometimes override many claimed minority perquisites, as they had
regularly safeguarded an indefensible ascendancy of elites boasting
oligarchic power or plutocratic wealth. In many respects, the history of
human rights is not the now-familiar protection of the marginal,
vulnerable, or weak, but the shielding of elite power from popular
incursion. As a result, it was not so much a matter of withdrawing
protection from the needy, as much as putting indefensible minority
power in its place for the sake of a majority rule rarely achieved in
national life. "The present government of the United States has never
taken away and never will take away any liberty from any minority,"
FDR explained of his pressure tactics and their outcome, "unless it be
a minority which so abuses its liberty as to do positive and definite
harm to its neighbors constituting the majority."' He added: "the

1.
1937),

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day (Sept. 17,
https://www.constitution.org/cmt/fdr/
SOCIETY,
CONSTITUTION
in
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government of the United States refuses to forget that the Bill of Rights
was put into the Constitution not only to protect minorities against
intolerance of majorities, but to protect majorities against the
enthronement of minorities." 2
Understandably, friends of rights past and present rank the
tyranny of the majority first among their fears. Though hardly friends
of rights, Plato and all the heirs of classical political thought have long
treated the collapse of democracy into despotism as likely if not
inevitable. By Roosevelt's lights, however, it is more important to begin
with the premise that not only rights, but also politics in general, have
usually served minorities. This most enduring fact about politics
makes tyranny of the minority a far more endemic difficulty to
confront, even in the midst of modern and formally democratic regimes
that have taken large strides beyond premodern monarchy and
aristocracy explicitly based on locking most people out of power. Most
political thought since the Greeks has not merely feared the people but
offered affirmations of the need for minority ascendancy if order and
justice are to survive. The modern question, therefore, is what it might
mean to take not just rights, but also democracy, seriously.3 What if
the greatest risk is not that majorities will trample the rights of
minorities, but that minorities will continue to rule over majorities? If
so, then it is all important to focus first on how to counteract this risk
including insofar as a concern for rights becomes a pretext for avoiding
its realities.
After a democratic breakthrough he symbolized, Roosevelt was
speaking precisely at a moment of profound political mutation that was
once again to favor suspicion of majority rule (not only through
electoral politics but also through other plausibly majoritarian
institutions). This suspicion has lasted through the present in the
major forms of wartime and later Cold War and post-Cold War
constitutional liberalism. 4 In the United States and around the world,
there was a "populist" wave in the 1930s that produced Roosevelt-and
fascism. Since then and until recently, political history has become one
of "contesting democracy" and containing it. 5 Yet Roosevelt's

address constitution day_1937.html [https://perma.cc/FGE5-MA561
12, 2019).
2.
Id.
3.

(archived on Sept.

See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harv. Univ.

Press 1977) (arguing against the "ruling" theory in Anglo-American law).
4.
See Richard Primus, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianismin Postwar
Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 423-25 (1996) (discussing antitotalitarianism in modern theories of constitutional law).
5.

See JAN-WERNER MULLER, CONTESTING DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE

TWENTIETH CENTURY 5-6 (Yale Univ. Press 2011) (analyzing the rise of anti-populist
democracy after World War II in response to fascism).
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perspective, at the height of a new populist wave, seems more pertinent
than ever. From his vantage point, sensitivity to prospective violations
of rights should not take priority because consecrating the power of
elite minorities could subvert the interests of the common people.
Roosevelt hoped that rights could serve majorities, but that could only
happen if the protection of rights-for the right minorities-was made
consistent with majority rule.
This Article is a call for more thought about how to reconcile
ongoing traditions of human rights with majority rule. The conceptual
and jurisprudential debate over the relationship of human rights and
democratic politics is, of course, hoary. What follows is not yet another
intervention in the abstract controversy over whether rights are
antecedent to democratic values, "equiprimordial" with them (as
6
J~irgen Habermas influentially claimed), or only plausible if following
from them. But in view of the contemporary situation, old debates
require some revisiting today from a less abstract and more strategic
perspective, with less emphasis on metaphysics and morals and more
focus on politics and tactics.
Today, the critical question is how human rights are most
plausibly regarded in the midst of a rising "populist" approach to
democracy, with little time to waste. The central argument this Article
offers is that, in the face of another round of democratic self-assertion,
human rights need to be reconceived as a potentially majoritarian
project, as well as embedded in larger packages of high-priority policy
that can sufficiently appeal to majorities and are congruent with their
interests. Indeed, it looks like rights will survive and thrive only if their
advocates find ways of participating in such a reconciliation between
majority interests and minority protections. (There are of course more
and less intelligent approaches to creating those packages.)
As in the 1930s, human rights around the world today are not
perceived as serving majorities. They perhaps serve majorities less
well than one might hope. Certainly, they are successfully identified by
demagogic politicians and right-wing parties as talismans raised on
behalf of minorities, including the most vulnerable and weak at the
margins of the nation-state. Conversely, they are rarely perceived to
be, or to fit with, priorities that will also serve a broad middle and
working-class majority. It is most tempting to conclude that what is
involved is a failure of marketing-a failure to convince the majority
that human rights and the corresponding legal institutions devised to
advance them do in fact protect its interests or are easily compatible

6.
JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 94 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press, 2d ed.

1996) (1992).
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with them. But while persuasive, this is not the whole story. None of
the principled reasons Roosevelt offered in support of majoritarian
politics of rights have changed. And it is patently clear from a strategic
perspective that human rights activism will fail unless it is
compellingly subsumed within a broader political agenda that
majorities find persuasively advances their ideals and interests. 7 The
consequences for most contemporary human rights efforts, whether
pursued through activist mobilization, governmental policy, or
national and international law (far from exclusively but most definitely
including judicial enforcement at various levels), are significant.
While this Article's arguments are portable beyond national
settings and particular situations, this Article examines the
reconciliation of human rights with majority politics in a specific
context by rehabilitating the thinking of a potentially unexpected
figure: United States Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter.
America generally rejects human rights in international law, except as
part of an export strategy that selectively defends human rights abroad
in diplomatic relations (and occasional wars). 8 Even so, in its
constitutional traditions, America has the deepest experience with the
intellectual and political quandary that has gone global today: how to
reconcile human rights with majority politics. To be sure, throughout
its history and up to the present, the country has distinguished itself
as the conservative homeland of rights safeguarded against the
upheaval of democratic passions.9 Yet an equally important truth is
that when human rights became associated with powerful and wealthy
minorities and drew complaints for obstructing majority rule, the
United States, for a brief moment, also bred the most creative thinking
about how to save human rights from their unpalatable associations in
order to be more compatible with majoritarian democracy.
Frankfurter's Rooseveltian thinking surges in importance in this
context. From the perspective of this compelling if recessive American
tradition, human rights have to be pursued now by convincing one's
fellow citizens to adhere enthusiastically to them. This means
reinterpreting and safeguarding them in a majoritarian spirit and
embedding them in a larger majoritarian package of policies.
After a long age of countermajoritarian strategies of human rights
advocacy, especially juristocratic ones, Frankfurter's demand that

7.

See infra Part IV.

8.

MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 7

(Michael Ignatieff ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2005).
9.

See generally HENRY SUMNER MAINE, POPULAR GOVERNMENT

197 (Henry

Reeve trans., Liberty Fund 1976) (1885) (Essay IV) (analyzing the Constitution as a
political instrument); 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve

trans., London, Saunders & Otley 1835) (examining the legal system in America).
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elites learn deference to majority rule, and that human rights figure in
a package of policies that serve majority interests, is compelling if
risky. In the short run, he may have failed in his agenda. Liberals in
the United States opted for countermajoritarian rights enforcement by
judicial means over his protest. Now a backlash that has climaxed (so
far) in a fifth reliably conservative vote on the Supreme Court today
has set in, one promising minority rule for as long as anyone can
foresee. And the United States is not the only country to have
minorities make recent bids to rule.
The first Part of this Article provides a digest and exegesis of the
principal claims of Frankfurter's dissent in West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette. The case, which concerned the rights claims of
Jehovah's Witnesses to be free from a state-imposed obligation to
salute the American flag, matters because it is where Frankfurter laid
0
out his theory of majoritarian rights at the greatest length.' The next
Part of this Article reflects on the applicability of Frankfurter's
approach to contemporary human rights politics. Along the way, the
Article takes up the countermajoritarian rights philosopher Ronald
Dworkin's critique of Learned Hand-the judge for whom Dworkin
clerked as a young man, not to mention Frankfurter's friend and
kindred spirit. In doing so, the goal is to reflect on the profound change
in liberal attitudes towards rights and democracy that has supervened
since Frankfurter struggled for majority rule, and to suggest that this
change now seems a faulty mistake. Democrats need not turn their
backs on rights, but they do need to overcome the mistake of relying on
the princes of law's empire (as Dworkin famously called judges) and
human rights activists (who sometimes assign themselves an
analogous role) as the preeminent guardians of rights. In a democracy,
that role falls to the people, ruling themselves.

II. FRANKFURTER ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND MAJORITY RULE
A. The Setting
Frankfurter's dissent in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette remains a high point of American constitutional law. It is a
convenient source, because it eloquently defended majority rule while
expressing hard-won and reflexive wariness about the difficulty of
making it compatible with human rights. Compared to attempts made
by recent generations, it struck a very different balance between the

W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
10.
dissenting).
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need to ensure against human rights violations and the importance of
countervailing the even greater risks of an elite control of democracy.
After long service as a professor at Harvard Law School,
Frankfurter was appointed as a justice in 1939, two years after the
"switch in time" of 1937, a storied event that capped fifty years of
progressive resistance to the judicial enforcement of the human rights
claims made by the powerful and wealthy minority of the country."
Notoriously, in Lochner v. New York the United States Supreme Court
had enforced, under the theory of substantive due process discovered
in the Fourteenth Amendment, a human right to the freedom of
contract.1 2 The decision was explicitly cast as one based on the
principle that, in the case of conflict between the will of a legislative
majority and "the inherent rights belonging to everyone," the latter
trumped the former. 13 For decades, that theory, as Roosevelt insisted,
caused enormous pain and suffering to majorities. 14 In the face of
popular self-assertion, the Supreme Court finally relented and
abandoned the project of testing majority legislation for its interference
with human rights.
It therefore fell to Frankfurter to man the ramparts of a former
institution of minority rule and save it from falling back into a
minoritarian rut. Frankfurter's Barnette dissent was shot through
with outrage that it was falling back so quickly, since the case reversed
a Supreme Court bench that a few years before Frankfurter could still
convince to let majorities have their say in the face of human rights
claims. In an earlier case, Minersuille School District v. Gobitis,'5
Frankfurter had argued for a nearly unanimous set of justices that
Jehovah's Witnesses had no right under the First Amendment (as
incorporated through the Fourteenth's due process clause) to claim an
exemption on grounds of free speech or free exercise of religion from a
generally applicable law that required students in public schools to
salute the American flag. 16 A mere three years after Gobitis ensured
that majority interests, and their reconciliation by the majority itself
with minority interests, were not open to countermajoritarian forces to
overturn, Barnette abruptly abandoned Frankfurter's search for
balance, risking a return of minority rule.
The most important reason for this startling turn of events was a
dawning certainty in 1943, now that Americans had been forced into

11.
See, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213 (1995) (analyzing the U.S.
Supreme Court during the Franklin D. Roosevelt presidency).
12.
198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905).
13.
Id. at 66.
14.
See Roosevelt, supra note 1.
15.
See generally 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
16.
Id. at 599-600.
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World War II, that they were fighting a "totalitarian" state. True, in
fighting Nazi Germany they were also allies with an equally
totalitarian Soviet Union. But American elites suddenly converged on
the principle that mistreatment of minorities in the name of
"nationalism" was something totalitarians did, not free people, even
when at war. Another and more proximate reason for the volte face may
well have been that the Gobitis decision had been followed by violence
which
locales,17
several
in
Witnesses
against Jehovah's
that
neglected
they
if
understandably troubled several justices-even
rights
the
supporting
were
conservative and free market interests
claims of this oppressed minority as a proxy for the advancement of
their own interests.' 8 As several historians have emphasized, there
was a liberal uproar immediately following the Gobitis decision, and
the heartrending fate of a number of Jehovah's Witness communities
19
seemed to confirm that Gobitis had been a dreadful mistake. At the
same time, partisans of Lochner seeking its eventual revival sensed a
20
moment to strike.
But it is not the fascinating historical details of either Barnette or
its predecessor, or even what precise factors caused Frankfurter in this
period to lose his majority, that matter for these purposes. After all,
Barnette was a small if significant event within the much more
profound loss Frankfurter suffered in his campaign to restrain the
countermajoritarian tendencies of his court, especially when it
intervened in the name of human rights. Rather, far beyond the narrow
issue of the judicial protection of basic values in particular, it is
Frankfurter's spectacular vision of how to make democratic rule
consistent with human rights that deserves close attention for its
relevance today. Frankfurter's rationale for a majoritarian approach to
human rights may even survive his potentially mistaken application of
it. Whatever one thinks of its outcome, detaching his democratic theory
from the details of the case helps one grasp that theory more easily.
B. Majority Versus Minority Rule
Frankfurter's first premise is that democracy is about majority
rule to determine social priorities, which include how much room to

SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES:
17.
PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 73 (2000).

RELIGIOUS

See infra Part II.C.
See PETERS, supra note 17; see also Robert Tsai, Prof. Robert Tsai (2018) at
2018),
8,
(Nov.
YOUTUBE
Anniversary,
Barnette
75th
[https://perma.cc/2JKP-A9AQ]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-NN-7fbwCRA
(archived on Sept. 12, 2019) (lecturing on the effects of W. Va. v. Barnette).
See infra Part II.C.
20.
18.
19.
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make for minorities. Human rights are certainly priorities, and it is for
this reason that the law sets out to afford them some protection. But
majority rule is also a priority, and if the majority has a reason for
proceeding other than violating the minority's right, then the only
question is whether priority goes to majority rule or minority rights.
To this question,
Frankfurter's answer in Barnette was
straightforward: "That which to the majority may seem essential for
the welfare of the state may offend the consciences of a minority."2 1 But
far from a cause for alarm, suppression of minority practices is a
condition of democratic rule, since the losers of elections must accept
policies with which they disagree. As Frankfurter explained:
[T]o deny the political power of the majority to enact laws concerned with civil
matters, simply because they may offend the consciences of a minority, really
means that the consciences of a minority are more sacred and more enshrined in
the Constitution than the consciences of a majority. 2 2

Allowing majorities to target minorities is one thing; allowing
minorities to substitute their policies for those of majorities is another.
Lurking in the background of this theory of democracy as majority
rule are two interrelated premises. One is a general proposition that
claims to individual rights express social priorities in potential
competition with others. The second is a focus, not on the best outcome
of that competition, but on who makes the choice among those
priorities; this determines if the people rule themselves or if someone
else does. A large number of social disputes, Frankfurter felt, are
conflicts about priorities and not things that are easy or even possible
to resolve uncontroversially, as if one side's assertion of its priority
were a trump card that overcomes the other side's comparable
assertion. And whether this is true on the plane of morality, it is
certainly the case in law that the people are empowered to rule
themselves just as individuals are given rights. If so, the central matter
is who should decide how to reconcile conflicts between themmajorities themselves, or someone else. "Tact, respect, and generosity
toward variant views will always commend themselves to those
charged with the duties of legislation so as to achieve a maximum of
good will and to require a minimum of unwilling submission to a
general law," Frankfurter acknowledged of the ethical pull of minority
concerns.2 3 He added: "But the real question is, who is to make such
accommodations, the courts or the legislature?" 24 Quis judicabit?

21.
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 662 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 651.
24. Id.
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Put another way, Frankfurter's essential normative commitment
was to democracy. It was not that there are no rights, whether human
or constitutional. But no one other than the people, under organized
systems of majority rule, can politically decide how rights claims bear
on policy outcomes-at least when the majority has some reason or
other for its policy besides a desire to violate minority rights. Indeed,
for Frankfurter, what made the decision to overturn the grant of power
to legislative majorities in Gobitis and earlier cases so fateful was that
"never before" had the "Supreme Court overruled decisions so as to
25
restrict the powers of democratic government." On this account, the
history of overturning precedent had always affirmed majority rule,
not undermined it. "Always heretofore," he claimed, the Supreme
Court "has withdrawn narrow views of legislative authority so as to
authorize what formerly it had denied." 26 Insofar as that was true,
1943 was as much a landmark date as 1937 was before it. The Supreme
Court reversed course on majority rule after six short years, and, since
that time, traditions of countermajoritarian jurisprudence for both
liberals and conservatives have been robust. That reversal led, as
Roberto Unger later expressed it, to "ceaseless identification of
restraints upon majority rule, rather than of restraints upon the power
of dominant minorities, as the overriding responsibility of judges and
jurists."27
Of course, one might intelligibly argue that it is easier than
Frankfurter thought to single out rights from other kinds of priorities.
It was on this point that Frankfurter lost his former majority on the
court in Barnette-at least officially. Justice Robert Jackson generally
sided with Frankfurter during his time on the bench, against the
dominant faction on the Supreme Court, led by Justice Hugo Black,
that operated with a very different-more absolutist and more
textualist-theory of countermajoritarian rights, which eventually led
28
Yet in
to the long period of judicialization of American politics.
Barnette, Frankfurter lost even Jackson's support, and Jackson wrote
the opinion for the court.
Jackson's opinion strongly suggests that his genuine reasons for
diverging from his friend concerned the need for symbolic demarcation
of American democracy during wartime from "our present totalitarian

25.
26.

Id. at 665-66.
Id. at 666.

27.

ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 72-

73 (1996).
See JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER,
28.
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 118-22 (1989).
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enemies." 29 Officially, he explained, he did not view the flag salute as
a significant enough social priority to create any conflict among rights
claimants, and certainly not one that ought to be decided by a
majority.30 "The refusal of these persons to participate in the
ceremony," Jackson explained of the Jehovah's Witnesses, "does not
interfere with or deny [the] rights of others to do so."*3 And because
Jackson rejected Frankfurter's view that wartime national unity might
plausibly require coercive nationalism, he defended the Jehovah's
Witnesses' right to abstain from saluting the flag.3 2

Jackson's principled distinction of the fact pattern in Barnette
justifying countermajoritarian intervention is interesting. According to
Jackson, a conscientious objector's asserted right should prevail when
the majority asserts not its own vision of rights but merely its own
policies. 33 Whatever its plausibility of Jackson's argument, his minor
disagreement with Frankfurter on this point took place against the
backdrop of major agreement among normative democrats. In other
cases involving the Jehovah's Witnesses, most notably in Jones v.
Opelika from precisely the same moment, Jackson sided in the majority
with Frankfurter when it came to the permissibility of taxing the
group. 34 In a related case, Jackson agreed that an asserted minority
right against an economic regulation was little more than an invitation
for judges to allow minorities to rule.3 5 This had been the cardinal error
of Lochner, and its repetition in the rise of Supreme Court rights
protection involved a profound risk for a return of Lochner's
principles. 36
Ironically, Jackson's routinely cited verbiage about human rights
from Barnette has obscured this deeper agreement. That "fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote [and that] they depend on the
outcome of no elections," as Jackson put it in Barnette, was only true-

29.

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641; see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST

REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980, 121-37 (2001)

(on the pivotal relevance of the specter of totalitarianism for Justice and later Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in this era); BENJAMINALPERS, DICTATORS, DEMOCRACY, AND
AMERICAN PUBLIC CULTURE: ENVISIONING THE TOTALITARIAN ENEMY, 1920s-1950S

(Alan Trachtenberg ed., 2003) (on broader context).
30.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630.
Id.
31.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
35.
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 180 (1943) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
36.
Cf. Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of FirstAmendment Lochnerism, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1920-22 (2016) (discussing the history of civil libertarian
challenges to the regulation of economic activity).
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37
he thought-when nobody else's rights were in play. The entire
purpose of rights, Jackson famously wrote, is "to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts."3 8 But it was a view Jackson
himself rejected for the reasons Frankfurter offered in Barnette when
majorities wanted to intrude upon allegedly sacrosanct economic rights
that their generation had spent its greatest efforts to overcome for the
sake of majority rule.

C. Minority Rights or Wrong Minorities?
This whole debate about whether and how to honor human rights
was given substance by the extraordinary specter of returning to the
Lochner regime in the very course of developing premises for
countermajoritarian intervention. In between 1937 and 1943-perhaps
the most pivotal years in Supreme Court history-Frankfurter and
other justices had to figure out what purpose constitutional law had
after the new starting point of allowing the majority to determine its
destiny in the face of minority rights claims. In interpretations of
economic legislation under the commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution and in consideration of state legislation as well, majorities
were now given absolute deference, and-as Justice Jackson agreedno rights claims bore on their prerogatives. What haunted Frankfurter
most of all and drove him to an even more complete deference to
majorities in Barnette than Jackson allowed, was the risk that hewing
out any form of countermajoritarian minority rights would in practice
allow the wrong minorities to once again tyrannize majorities.
This all-important concern is difficult to tease out from
Frankfurter's dissent in Barnette, in part because it is omnipresent.
Indeed, Frankfurter's opinion and subsequent career forms one long
between
association
expectable
the
about
warning
countermajoritarian rights protection and the tyranny of minorities.
He worried that elites, such as judges, who set out to chasten
democracy in the name of rights, knowingly or unknowingly serve
minorities, as in the Lochner era before. An important lesson follows
from his caution. Committing to protect the vulnerable and the weak
may not always robustly serve those victims, but regularly does open
new avenues for the powerful and strong to circumvent democratic
agency.

37.
38.

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
Id.
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One interesting sign of the concern about opening avenues for the
wrong minorities to rule arises right at the start of Frankfurter's
dissent-just after his immortal opening, which reminds readers that,
as a Jew and thus a member of "the most vilified and persecuted
minority in history," he is far from insensitive to the abuse of the rights
of the vulnerable and weak. 39 Yet Frankfurter added immediately that,
even so, protecting minorities involves using power that can and will
be used for other things. If so, extraordinary care is therefore necessary
to assure the proper use of human rights in politics and law, in view of
the risk of their abuse. It is for this reason that Frankfurter slyly refers
to the fact that "not so long ago we were admonished" 40 as much, citing
a prior opinion of Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone: "For the removal
of unwise laws from the statute books appeal lies, not to the courts, but
to the ballot and to the processes of democratic government." 4 1 To avoid
the risk of minority cooptation of allegedly uncontroversial rights to
advance their own controversial interests, the only cure to democracy
was democracy-including in instances where rights were arguably at
stake.
It was a sly allusion not only because Frankfurter did not name
his colleague, but also because Stone, now animated by terror of foreign
totalitarianism, had entered a lonely dissent in Gobitis and, in 1943,
saw the court take his side. 42 Frankfurter's point, however, was that
Stone was not respecting the great wariness of countermajoritarian
rights enforcement that he had himself urged at the end of the Lochner
era, and which he had eventually helped overcome before Frankfurter
even joined the court. In short, Frankfurter was suggesting that
Stone-with the court now following him-was reverting to the very
position Stone had once rightly castigated. Frankfurter had warned
Stone in private at the time he entered his dissent in Gobitis; now,
finding himself the loser, Frankfurter made his admonition public. 43
It is reasonable to wonder why the wrong minorities cannot take
advantage of majoritarian practices and institutions, if they can take
advantage of countermajoritarian ones. And of course, they can and do.
However, Frankfurter and Jackson, like Stone on the court before
them, had lived through a remarkable period that convinced them that
the universal risks of practical and institutional capture by self-dealing
elites were not always equal. They remained wary that the high risk of

39.
See id. at 646 (Justice Frankfurter explaining the obligation to the
Constitution, regardless of a justice's background or religious identity).
40.
Id. at 647.
41.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
42.
See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601-07 (1940) (Stone, J.,
dissenting); Butler, 297 U.S. at 79. See also Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624.
43.
Kessler, supra note 36, at 1953 (reviewing Frankfurter's and Stone's
interactions around the cases).
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minority interests dominating legislatures were at least easier to
counteract through popular mobilization, while countermajoritarian
institutions-though also possible to overcome-required far more
effort and time. In Adrian Vermeule's terms, these were figures who
did not regard public law as a matter of insuperable contradictions, but
of "competing risks and tradeoffs." 44 For them, the balance of risks and
tradeoffs favoring majority rule (in spite of the threat that minorities
could simply rule through allegedly popular decision-making) was
clear, apart from exceptional cases.
In the year of Barnette, Columbia University historian Henry
Steele Commager wrote a book in Frankfurter's defense, dedicating it
to him, arguing much more explicitly than Frankfurter could in his
dissent that rights proclaimed for all would likely function in practice
45
Commager insisted that, as
to protect powerful and wealthy elites.

.

Thomas Jefferson had predicted in 1801, the power to enforce rights
against majorities could function to give powerful and wealthy
minorities the highest incentive to "retire into the judiciary as a
46
stronghold," so as to wear down democracy from there. Frankfurter
had himself observed in Barnette that "Jefferson's opposition to judicial
review has not been accepted by history, but it still serves as an
admonition against confusion between judicial and political functions.
. . For those who pass laws not only are under duty to pass laws. They
47
Crediting
are also under duty to observe the Constitution."
Frankfurter in the Barnette dissent with a "masterly logic" and
canvassing major considerations in favor of Frankfurter's views,
Commager insisted that the best and only hope for minority rightsespecially if excessive risks of empowering the wrong minorities were
to be avoided-lay in majority rule. 4 8 Or, as Jefferson had put it
himself, "[t]he mass of the people is the safest depository for their own
rights." 49
In retrospect, it is difficult to quarrel with Frankfurter's worry
that countermajoritarian rights enforcement, like all but the weakest

44.

ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK 2 (2013) ("[T]he tensions

between and among the values of constitutionalism are best understood not as
contradictions, but as competing risks and tradeoffs.").
45.

See HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 12-

13 (Oxford Univ. Press 1943) (discussing historical concerns of the majority bowing to a
minority that can then exploit systems to protect a minority of wealthy, powerful
individuals); see also Brad Snyder, Felix Frankfurterand Popular Constitutionalism,47
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 345 (2013) (discussing Justice Frankfurter's encouragement of
Jefferson's views of democratic government).
See COMMAGER, supra note 45, at 32, 60 (internal citations omitted).
46.
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 667 (1943).
47.
COMMAGER, supra note 45, at 74.
48.
Id. at 76 (internal citation omitted).
49.
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forms of undemocratic intervention, will expectably lead to the
contestable empowerment of the wrong minorities. Indeed, this would
seem to be one of the principal lessons of the current "neoliberal" era,
which has seen the ascendancy of comparable wealth and power that
the New Deal in the American case and the rise of the welfare state
globally was intended to contain.50 It can be debated whether
Frankfurter was mistaken when it came to Barnette's outcome, for the
reasons Jackson laid out.5 1 But in a broader sense, these years of
reinventing judicial rights enforcement were also, as Jeremy Kessler
has powerfully demonstrated, "the early years of First Amendment
Lochnerism," 52 during which the constraint on majority rule in the
name of the interests of wealthy and powerful minorities was
resurrected within constitutional law, with fateful consequences in the
long run.
No longer were those interests to be justified in terms of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but instead as a matter
of the personal rights protected by the First Amendment. 5 3 In wartime,
the Jehovah's Witnesses cases crystallized countermajoritarian
judicial review for the sake of civil liberties. In doing so, plans laid since
1937 by activist Wall Street lawyer Grenville Clark and others-who
recognized the new civil liberties as a powerful mode of reinstating
checks on majority rule, including over the organization of the
economy-were fulfilled. 54 Soon after Clark announced in 1937 his
plan to return to the Lochner era via civil liberties, Frankfurter chided
him: "Your view, of the Supreme Court, as the great safe-guard of those
democratic institutions that you and I so passionately care about, is
much too romantic and too simplified"-not least because it reinstated
the risk of rule by the wrong minorities.5 5 The uses of the First
Amendment and many other parts of the Constitution in the decades
since suggests that Frankfurter was correct.5 6

50.

See THOMAS PIKETTY,

CAPITAL IN THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY

161-62

(Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harv. Univ.. Press 2014) (discussing how development of
the welfare state has been impacted by inequality).
51.
See supra Part II.B.
52.
See generally Kessler, supra note 36 (discussing the impacts of restricted
majority rule).
53.
Famously, the Due Process Clause itself was later retrieved as a source of
new personal rights not elsewhere guaranteed, notably the much debated right to
privacy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1965) (extending a right to privacy
grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
54.
See Kessler, supra note 36, at 1943 (discussing Clark's Bill of Rights
Committee as a means of moderating civil liberties law).
55.
Id. at 1945.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010)
56.
(holding that government suppression of political speech by a corporation violates the
right to free speech protected by the First Amendment).
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D. Rights and DemocraticLearning
As early as in the Gobitis case, Frankfurter had insisted that, far
from allocating a monopoly on their enforcement, it was critical for
majorities themselves to take rights seriously-in part to avoid
abdicating responsibility for them. Indeed, doing so might include the
more rights protection than
opportunity for greater and
countermajoritarian actors could plausibly supply. After all, even the
risk that majorities might violate rights could invite a new conception
of democracy as a project of collective learning in defining and
institutionalizing rights. "[E]ducation in the abandonment of foolish
57
legislation is itself a training in liberty," Frankfurter maintained. "To
fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum of public
opinion and before legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such
a contest to the judicial arena, serves to vindicate the self-confidence
of a free people." 5 8
Now in Barnette Frankfurter made explicit the debts he liked to
profess to a great intellectual predecessor both at Harvard Law School
and as an advocate of near-absolute judicial restraint: James Bradley
Thayer.5 9 In doing so, however, Frankfurter updated the latter's
eloquent thinking about the value of democratic error for an emerging
era of civil liberties and human rights that Thayer could not have
foreseen, and for normatively democratic purposes it is not entirely
clear that Thayer ever evinced.
A late nineteenth century jurist, Thayer had been rediscovered
and even reinvented by Frankfurter and his progressive friends in the
early twentieth century. 60 Mark Tushnet has argued (not altogether
persuasively) that Thayer may even have originally been a
conservative concerned about inadvertent judicial demobilization of a
like-minded populace, rather than a protoprogressive concerned that
right-wing judges would strike down economic legislation during the
imminent Lochner era. 61 It is equally if not more likely-though hard
to prove-that Thayer's exposure to the British parliamentary system
convinced him that uninhibited majority rule was the best and main

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940).
Id.
59.
See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 667-71 (1943) (citing James
Bradley Thayer on judicial review).
See generally James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
60.
Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129 (1893).
Compare Mark Tushnet, Thayer's Target: JudicialReview or Democracy?, 88
61.
NW. U. L. REV. 9, 11 (1993) (arguing that Thayer thought judicial review would be used
to mitigate the effects of politics on progressive legislation), with G. Edward White,
Revisiting JamesBradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 48,49 (1993) (arguing that "Thayer's
views were characteristic of Brahmin members of gentry political culture.").
57.
58.
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guarantor of freedom and justice. 6 2 Not only was no judicial review
necessary for democracy to preserve basic values in Britain's long
constitutional history; it did not even require a written constitution. In
the absence of any checks, the bearers of parliamentary supremacy in
Britain accepted the grave responsibility of their offices, along with
undivided power, even after the vast expansion of suffrage over the
nineteenth century.63 And Thayer reinterpreted the "American
doctrine of constitutional law" (which undeniably featured some sort of
countermajoritarian arrangements) so that it diverged as minimally as
possible from simple legislative supremacy. 64 Thayer probably thought
it was superior to eliminate judicial review within the framework of an
unwritten constitution, but he did not regard America's different
arrangement as fatal to popular rule if it was allowed to take place
without interference. In any case, with or without judicial review or a
written constitution, the priority was to promote democratic learning
and responsibility.
For Thayer, democracy hardly meant that the popular will could
not or would not make mistakes. Yet preemption of those mistakes was
likely to court even greater risks. There was no hope for freedom and
justice if the popular will was not allowed to learn without
countermajoritarian obstruction, which would not only cut off the
learning process after past mistakes but also deaden responsibility for
future ones. To this effect, Frankfurter now cited Thayer at length in
the closing peroration of his Barnette dissent, now updated in view of
the urgent need to reconcile democratic self-rule and rights protection.
Frankfurter cited Thayer affirming:
Great and, indeed, inestimable as are the advantages in a popular government
of this conservative influence-the power of the judiciary to disregard
unconstitutional legislation-it should be remembered that the exercise of it,
even when unavoidable, is always attended with a serious evil, namely that the
correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the people thus
lose the political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that come
from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own

62.
See Jay Hook, A Brief Life of James Bradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(1993) (stating that Thayer's familiarity with England's constitution informed his
position on judicial reviewability of legislative action and reporting on his visit during
the debates over the 1884-85 Reform Act).
63.
See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 155-56 (Riverside Press 1901)
("The popular will: it is, in the free countries of the old and new world, the source and
end of all power; to the extent it is healthy, nations prosper whatever the imperfections
and lapses of their institutions, while if good sense is lacking, and passions carry it away,
the most perfect constitutions and the wisest laws are powerless. That ancient maxim,
quid leges sine moribus?, is thus the last word of political science.") (citing ANDRP, DE
FRANQUEVILLE, LE SYSTAME JUDICIAIRE DE LA GRANDE BRETAGNE 25-26 (J. Rothschild

ed., 1893)). The Latin phrase means: what are laws without morals?
64.
See generally Thayer, supranote 60.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

1152

[VOL. 52:1135

errors.. . . And if it be true that the holders of legislative power are careless or
evil, yet the constitutional duty of the court remains untouched; it cannot rightly
65
attempt to protect the people by undertaking a function not its own.

In short, when judicial guardians do not act when human rights
are at stake, it is an opportunity to "powerfully help to bring the people
66
and their representatives to a sense of their own responsibility." After
these stirring words, Frankfurter closed with his own wisdom:
Reliance for the most precious interests of civilization, therefore, must be found
outside of their vindication in courts of law. Only a persistent positive translation
of the faith of a free society into the convictions and habits and action of a
community is the ultimate reliance against unabated temptations to fetter the
67
human spirit.

Admittedly, in the form in which he left it, Frankfurter's
Thayerian defense of democratic learning is subject to a number of
reservations. It is not obvious that people (individuals or groups) will
in fact learn from their mistakes, instead of repeating them again and
again. Even if learning occurs in the short term, one might hold out for
legal mechanisms-such as constitutional rights-to lock in lessons
learned for the long term. Moreover, the costs for those who suffer
while mistakes are made are potentially high. Yet Frankfurter
generalized from his own blessed situation as an immigrant Jew to
infer that Americans, whatever their momentary errors, would never
stray too far from their high principles. This was despite the fact that
he wrote during the height of Jim Crow, and at a moment when the
president who appointed him turned a blind eye to Jews in need.
Furthermore, learning normally depends on teachers, who enjoy
hierarchical superiority and have reliable expertise-neither of which
were clearly present in Frankfurter's model. These are all major
difficulties that forbid any simple affirmation of the expectation of
democratic learning.
But for all its omissions, the value of what Frankfurter endorsed
in Thayer's approach was a relative optimism about the people
(coupled with interlocking pessimism about elites). Based-once
again-on a kind of risk assessment, such guarded optimism held that
the people could in fact learn to rule well by committing to learning by
doing (and sometimes failing). By contrast, elites had a millennial
record of ruling for their own sake. Even if elites could hypothetically
and occasionally save the people the trouble of ruling well without

65.
66.
67.

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 667-68 (quoting THAYER, supra note 63, at 104-10).
Id. at 670.
Id. at 670-71.
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engaging in malignant self-dealing, by doing so they would destroy any
possibility that the people could gain practice in ruling themselves.
Updating Thayer's argument for an age of human rights, Frankfurter
was suggesting that premature or unnecessary action to keep
majorities in bounds, attending to the risk of imminent or ongoing
rights violations, comes with its own risks-not just of elite capture of
countermajoritarian
devices, but also of stunting political
responsibility and obviating self-correcting education. During the same
years that other liberals were drawing lessons from European history
that the uttermost had to be done to save human rights from the threat
of democratic collapse-going so far, in Karl Loewenstein's famous
theory of "militant democracy," 68 to deny rights themselves to those
who threatened them-Frankfurter was drawing lessons from
American history that the uttermost had to be done to keep a
commitment to human rights from arresting majority rule in the name
of chastening it.
Unlike Commager, and Jefferson before him, Frankfurter left room
for some form of judicial review. He also stopped short of more recent
critic of judicial review Jeremy Waldron, whose recent activism on this
score has missed Frankfurter's most momentous suspicion-not that
legislatures are better at protecting rights than judiciaries but that
they are more immune to the risks of minority tyranny.6 9 A
Jeffersonian movement may well reemerge in response to conservative
judicial activism today, but the arguments for and against that
campaign are beyond the scope of this Article. What is interesting
about Frankfurter, compared to more radical Jeffersonian populists on
judicial review, is his broader concern for the reconciliation of human
rights and majority rule. For the question is how Frankfurter's general
thinking on the coexistence of democracy and rights in light of elite
threats might bear on human rights politics today.
E. Rights FallibilistsVersus Rights Guardians
Frankfurter's theory was premised on a pronounced sense of
fallibility (not skepticism) that implied that no one had a superior
claim to determine the meaning and scope of rights. Predictably,
Ronald Dworkin associated the theory with moral relativism and
pragmatism, while suggesting that abandoning such errors about

68.
See Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and FundamentalRights, I, 31
AM. POL. Sol. REV. 417, 417 (1937); Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and
Fundamental Rights, II, 31 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 638, 638 (1937) (both defending the
limitation of rights to protect the democratic order).
69.
See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against JudicialReview, 115 YALE
L.J. 1346, 1348 (2006) (advocating against judicial review in a democratic society).
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rights allowed for an enthusiastic confidence in countermajoritarian
elites enforcing principles. When it came to Frankfurter's most
eminent disciple, Judge Learned Hand, for whom Dworkin once
clerked, Dworkin acknowledged the fallibilist roots of a normative
commitment to democracy, but nonetheless insisted on the same
confidence in an elite alternative. Looking back at Dworkin's
arguments against Frankfurter and Hand in an era of "revolt of the
elites" 7 0 may require abandoning them in turn.
In his Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures at Harvard Law School in
1958, Hand had channeled the spirit of the Barnette dissent, which he
cited and called "unanswerable" a full fifteen years after its issuance71
and with much water, notably Brown v. Board of Education, under
72
And for this reason, he cast
the bridge in the meantime.
enforcement of
doubt on countermajoritarian
extraordinary
constitutional rights when majorities were not prepared to grant them,
essentially on the Frankfurterian ground that such action came
inseparably with the tyranny of the minority, and the Thayerian
ground that it ruined democratic learning and vitality. 73 As a result,
countermajoritarian action ought to be prevented from devolving into
Platonic guardianship.
In his half-loving but highly opinionated critique of his old judge's
articulation of the "strongest doctrine of restraint ever defended by a
major judicial figure," Ronald Dworkin conceded that Hand was no
moral skeptic. 74 But Dworkin nonetheless asserted that Hand had had
"a disabling uncertainty that he-or anyone else-could discover which
convictions were true: he thought moral matters much too subtle and
75
complex to allow anyone much confidence in his own opinions." In
short, Hand was a fallibilist. Dworkin responded to his position by

70.

See generally CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE

BETRAYAL OF DEMOcRAcY 25 (W.W. Norton 1995) (describing how educated
professionals can pose the greatest danger to democracy).
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1954) (holding lower courts
71.
accountable for the enforcement of constitutional principles and implementation of the
Supreme Court's landmark decision).
72.

See, e.g., LEARNED HAND,

THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL

HOLMES LECTURES 1, 51 (Hary. Univ. Press 1958) (referring specifically to Frankfurter's
refutation of the plausibility of selecting out civil liberties rather than a fallen economic
liberty for judicial protection).
Id. at 10, 56, 68, 73.
73.
Others have contended that Hand did indeed descend into skepticism after
74.
World War II, given the near absolute deference he showed as a judge in United States
v. Dennis, 183 F.2d. 201 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), and other cases. See
Edward Purcell, Jr., Learned Hand: The Trajectory of an Old Progressive, 43 BUFF. L.
REV. 873 (1995).
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM's LAW: A MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION
75.

342 (Hary. Univ. Press 1997).
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observing that fallibilism on its own settles nothing: all decision
makers proceed under equal uncertainty, including majorities.7 6
Dworkin also acknowledged Hand's Thayerian commitment to
democratic learning, brilliantly expressed in his wartime affirmation
that "liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there,
no constitution, no law, no court can save it."77 To this point, Dworkin
simply insisted that "individual citizens can in fact exercise the moral
responsibilities of citizenship better when final decisions involving
constitutional values are removed from ordinary politics and assigned
to courts, whose decisions are meant to turn on principle, not on the
weight of numbers or the balance of political influence."7 8
Meant as an engagement with the Frankfurterian position,
Dworkin's answer not only presupposes the availability of greater
certainty in moral theory than fallibilists consider plausible. It also
lacks any concern for democratic legitimation, any assessment of
comparative risks of mistake (and which institutions are likelier to
learn from it), and above all, any fear of minority rule under the mask
of moral principle. The reason, it would seem, is that, in the Platonic
tradition, Dworkin actually supported elite rule. As elsewhere in his
work, in his reminiscence of Hand, he made a gesture towards
committing normatively to democracy. But he certainly did not
embrace a majoritarianism that could relieve some set of
philosophically careful guardians-ones who shared Dworkin's own
views of course-from the obligation to reason about moral values and
thereby allow democracy the sort of moral deliberation it would
otherwise lack. Shades of mob rule haunted this approach and counted
on familiar trust in the rule of the wise. Absent any sense of the
unending realities of minority rule, however, Dworkin's position is not
aging well. After all, its heirs are currently the right-wing
counterrevolutionaries whose decisions are objectionable to Platonists
only because they involve a mistake in their ethical substance rather
than in their forcible minoritarian imposition-for Dworkin and other
defenders of human rights against democratic support would prefer to
see their own views imposed by fiat themselves.
Frankfurter's fallibilism was not simply attached to the meaning
and scope of human rights but also to any hope of finding specific rights
that guardians could more confidently protect. Not only did no one have
a plausible case for displacing majority definition of human rights, as
Frankfurter contended in Barnette, but also there was no reason to do
so for the sake of some privileged set of rights. Privileging one or more
rights-freedom of contract, say, or freedom from torture-for the sake

76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 344.
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of empowering some higher authority to vindicate them would not
work, on this account. Once again, Frankfurter focused less on the
ethical substance of rights claims and more on their functional shift of
power from democratic self-rule to somebody else. Rights were rights,
Frankfurter had insisted, and all were under democratic control
despite claimed differences in their substance. None could be seen to
have priority over others, and there was no putative way to rank their
cognizability by judicial or other authorities such that it would make
sense to police majorities by interfering in the name of some rights
rather than others.
Frankfurter explained:
The Constitution does not give us greater veto power when dealing with one
phase of 'liberty' than with another . .. The right not to have property taken
without just compensation has, so far as the scope of judicial power is concerned,
the same constitutional dignity as the right to be protected against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and the latter has no less claim than freedom of the press
79
or freedom of speech or religious freedom.

Once again, this claim arose from the long battle against the
tyranny of the minority in the name of rights. The same awareness of
or other
to empower judges
practice
what it meant in
allegedly
against
minorities
countermajoritarian authorities to protect
of
freedom
of
those
just
not
oppressive majorities applied to all rights,
would
It
era.
Lochner
of
the
contract and sanctified private property
not work to suggest that some new set of rights, like civil liberties, were
more eligible for elite control.
In summary, it was not just that Frankfurter disputed that rights
were trumps, aside from outlying moments in which majorities
behaved so irrationally that judicial intervention was required. Rather,
it was that Frankfurter firmly believed that judges possessed no
expertise in balancing rights against rights or other priorities
"proportionally" or in some other way. 80 His emphasis fell on the
universal fallibility of all decision-making, such that the purpose of
democracy was to provide mechanisms amidst disagreement and
uncertainty to make the decision about the substance and scope of
rights in relation to overall policy.

W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943).
79.
Cf. Jamal Greene, Rights as Thumps?, 132 HARv. L. REV. 28, 96 (2018)
80.
(discussing the merits of the "rights-as-trumps" framework, contrasted with a less
absolutist framework).
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III. CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS POLITICS

Today is widely regarded as a moment of emergency for human
rights around the world.8 1 There is no doubt that the present moment
of human rights politics is quite distinct from any time in the past,
especially since so much success has been achieved in recent decades
in institutionalizing rights protection in so many domestic settings and
at the international level. 82 But it is nonetheless interesting to ask how
Frankfurter's vision of a democratic rights culture bears on the crisis
of human rights today. It does so powerfully, with certain modifications
and updates.
But to begin with, the emergency requires specifying the
conditions under which a theory like Frankfurter's might apply at all.
Clearly, Frankfurter presupposed that there is a democracy healthy
enough for a majority to fight for its rights, a democracy that many
may reasonably claim to be unavailable in diverse settings that
strongmen rule-or, as many argue, never existed in the first place
there or elsewhere. To the extent that democracy genuinely devolves
into tyranny or does not exist, Frankfurter's theory becomes
inapplicable. Indeed, the international human rights movement was
born in response to this situation, whether for the sake of the
communist Eastern bloc or the despotic southern cone of Latin America
(or the Global South generally). 83 To the extent that international law
and transnational movements allow human rights violations due to
undemocratic rule to be raised to the level of global concern,
opprobrium, and stigma, it is all to the good. Frankfurter himself, an
immigrant from Adolf Hitler's Vienna, had an eye on European affairs
at the time of Barnette; it is doubtful whether he would have had any
dispute with human rights movements as commonly understood today,
had there been any in response to Nazi tyranny. 84 And transnational
legal forms of human rights protection fit perfectly with Frankfurter's
outlook because of the extra tool they provide for citizen mobilization

81.
See Will Bordell & Jon Robins, 'A Crisis for Human Rights': New Index
Reveals Fall in Basic Justice, GUARDIAN, Jan. 31, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/
inequality/2018/jan/31/human-rights-new-rule-of-law-index-reveals-global-fall-basicjustice [https://perma.cc/AQ8F-SV3F] (archived Sept. 19, 2019).
82.
See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA 176-77 (Hary. Univ. Press 2010)
(examining the development of the role of international law in protecting human rights).
83.

See ARYEH NEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN

RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A

HISTORY 3 (Princeton Univ. Press 2012); id. at 179.
84.
However, it is known that Frankfurter was one of the Jewish notables whom
the Pole Jan Karski, in a now notorious episode, sought out with some of the earliest
news of the Holocaust in 1943-and Frankfurter did not believe him. See WALTER
LAQUEUR, THE TERRIBLE SECRET: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE SUPPRESSION OF
INFORMATION ABOUT HITLER'S "FINAL SOLUTION" 229-38 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1980).
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85
beyond moral claims and constitutional rights. Whether found in
claimed or feigned morality, constitutional text or spirit, or
international legal sources, democratically pursued human rights were
Frankfurter's concern. There is no reason to think that when
democratic agency is in the mix of contemporary human rights politics,
it courts the risk of minority rule.
But it is also true that human rights politics has regularly taken
forms that conflict with Frankfurter's principled and strategic view
that democracy must save itself in the absence of a savior. There are
forms-even privileged forms-of human rights politics that do not fit
well with democratic politics. Most obviously, human rights are now
intimately associated with the judicial enforcement of rights that
Frankfurter scrutinized. In spite of Frankfurter's warnings, however,
such enforcement has not only conquered his country but the whole
world in the age of "juristocracy."86 Of course, not all judiciaries
enforcing rights take action based on constitutional arrangements that
entrench the norms or allow invalidation of legislation, since some
human rights standards are statutory. Even then, the global tendency
has been for judges to take responsibility for expanding and redefining
statutory human rights, often outrunning popular legitimation and
stoking backlash.8 7 In short, no one can doubt that the juristocratic
wave of our time has been part of an empowerment of legal elites in a
global project that has reached self-evident limits. And, in
Frankfurter's own United States, where the syndrome was born and
from which it was exported, the advancement of liberal causes under
countermajoritarian auspices, however effective for a time, has long
since been reversed into reactionary judicial activism. Indeed, many
anticipate that a rerun of the progressive campaign against a judiciary
enforcing a tyranny of the minority-including in the name of rights,
as in the so-called First Amendment Lochnerism of recent cases-will
be in the offing sooner or later.88 In this light, it is ironic that Beth
Simmons has defended the democratic uses of human rights, while also
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viewing not just legislation but judicial enforcement as their prized
mechanism.89

In the current moment, obviously, many will draw the reverse
conclusion, especially in light of other national cases where judiciaries
are viewed as the last bastion of basic values against populist
incursion. On this view, Frankfurter's faith in a popular movement
against the juristocratic protection of rights looks very different when
the politician in question is (to take one who has stacked his own
country's courts with stooges) Viktor Orban rather than FDR.9 0 But
there are several responses to the nightmare scenario that justify the
elite control of democracy across the board on such grounds. For one
thing, it is critical to distinguish rather than homogenize national
cases, precisely where democracy is nowhere near collapse.9 1 And
notwithstanding the force of the argument that judges could
hypothetically resist fascism, the Frankfurterian perspective begs the
question of whether the majorities that have put Orban and other
"populists" in power are in revolt for a reason. Furthermore,
Frankfurter also worried that the attempt to protect basic rights
through judicial agents backfired when it deprived advocates of rights
sufficient incentive to take their cause to the people, and, in turn,
deprived the people of the opportunity to learn from their mistakes
under liberal democracy before it was too late.92 None of these
perspectives figure in contemporary discussion, in which judicial
control of rights is romanticized as a quick fix.
But of course, Frankfurter's perspective was far broader than
stigmatizing the judiciary. It bore on attending, quite generally, to the
risk of embracing elite control on democratic life-and to the fact that
rights protection, while a significant concern, could never take a
backseat to popular self-rule, let alone function as an end run around
it. In this regard, a narrow discussion of the failures (or successes) or
dispensability (or necessity) of judicial rights enforcement today would

89.
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91.
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miss the point of his broader intervention and the Rooseveltian politics
of democratization that it defended.9 3
The touchy Frankfurterian question is whether there are forms of
contemporary human rights politics that have functioned to defend the
interests of the wrong minorities. Clearly, some people believe so. Even
without indulging the dubiously conspiratorial approaches of those
who see the rise of human rights politics in recent decades as a device
of or a smokescreen for elite rule, it is worth considering whether
human rights laws, movements, and politics have coexisted with the
minoritarian and plutocratic capture of national, regional, and global
institutions. In theory, and especially in practice, human rights have
been framed to address the most exigent distributive insufficiency,
bypassing the extraordinary rises in inequality. 94 The claim is about a
disconnect between the priorities established by human rights politics
and what majorities might prefer to prioritize-including, of course,
their own self-rule. To the extent that this claim is true, it is only
natural that the majorities, upset by elite success in the midst of their
own disempowerment and stagnation, would respond by turning their
backs on the marginal, weak, and vulnerable. And it is not shocking,
though it is sad, when the majorities are incited to scapegoat victims
in a classic political tactic. Instead of responding with majority politics
of their own, however, advocates of human rights have often fretted
about the marginal and weak and offered lectures.
Beyond distributional politics, one can also make a broader case
that human rights politics has simply bypassed the public policy
problem of persistent minority rule. Human rights in general have not
been deployed against the strongholds of elite rule; movements have
encouraged framing the problem as violations of individual perquisites
rather than illicit concentrations of power. One might say, in
Commager's or Jefferson's spirit, that even to the extent human rights
politics has not been a device of minority rule its participants have had
little to say about the fact that the powerful and wealthy have degraded
95
The optical
the significance of the democratic will in our time.
associations of human rights have tended to move in an elite direction
that easily allows their mistaken identification with unaccountable
power-a mistaken identification abetted by the fact that human
rights laws and movements challenge that power only indirectly, if at
all. It is true that human rights politics may sometimes veer in a

93.
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popular direction themselves, but it has so far been rare. More often
than not, both the role of faraway judges and the countermajoritarian
informational politics of nongovernmental elites-appealing to fellow
elites to rein in government heartlessness-have failed to make a
connection to majority interests. Just as, on the distributive side, the
trade unions and the socialist parties have fallen from prominence in
the age of NGOs, so too have party politics and legislative participation
been avoided by most advocates of human rights, in part to
convincingly assume the guise of political neutrality.
A more democratic form of human rights advocacy would not only
have to counteract the risks of contributing to or distracting from
minoritarian ascendancy and drop the idealization of and the reliance
on elite controls; it would also have to drop its contempt for democracy
as a badly flawed, generally irrational, and routinely lesser form of
decision-making. "Reasoned argument elaborating underlying moral
principles," Dworkin wrote in his critique of Hand, "is rarely part of or
even congenial to" the democratic process, so that "the civil benefits of
public discussion . .. can be realized only when judges and the public
cooperate in securing them." 96 For Dworkin, it is not just that
guardians are systematically better decision-makers; it is also that
even popular forms of decision-making depend on judicial input to have
any quality, without which choice becomes a matter of unprincipled
compromise, power, and unreason. Late in life, Dworkin wrote a book
entitled Is Democracy Possible Here?, but like many others, he felt it
was only desirable to a limited extent, under the guidance of others.9 7
Finally, a more popular human rights politics that accepts risks
would be more open to Frankfurter's insight into the allocation to
majorities of the risk of error, therefore allowing them opportunities to
learn from their mistakes. In contrast, the widespread elite
mobilization against the votes for Brexit and Donald Trump-attempts
to reverse and to undermine both through nonelectoral means 9 8
provides graphic evidence that few believe majorities should enjoy the
privilege to make mistakes and learn from them. Yet correcting
mistakes from within a democracy as fellow citizens is a far more
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desirable and plausible vision for human rights activism than
circumventing it, which in any case predictably leads to backlash and
rage.
Of course, trust in the people, if it is not to be blind, partly depends
on how democracy is institutionally organized. Frankfurter's own
views were presumably that free and fair elections mattered, but also
that mass partisan representation at multiple levels, such as
governmental agencies, organized parties, and trade unions, held
similar importance. 9 9 It is notable that much of his early career was
devoted to the cause of unions, in support of their political goals as well
10 0
He
as their quests for the rights to form, negotiate, and strike.
certainly supported America's last great "populist" politician,
Roosevelt, who returned the favor by appointing him to the court. But
Frankfurter did not address the problem so many analysts imagine
today of a forced choice between elite and more or less technocratic rule
on the one hand and apocalyptic or vague appeals to "the people" on
the other. What a plausible appeal to the people as the guardian of its
own rights would look like has barely been addressed in theory or
practice because, forsaking Frankfurter's legacy, proponents of human
rights have avoided framing it as a problem-though it is perhaps the
central one for the future of human rights politics.

IV. CONCLUSION: FROM PRINCIPLE TO STRATEGY

Human rights politics may deserve no blame, on any fair
appraisal, for the costs of elite rule in the recent era-and indeed may
have lessened those costs in at least some limited respects. But one
must add a more openly instrumental and strategic approach to
Frankfurter's intrinsic and principled arguments for the imperative of
reconciling democracy and rights.' 0 For as leading authority in the
field Philip Alston has written recently, in the present crisis, "human
rights proponents need to rethink many of their assumptions, re-
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evaluate their strategies, and broaden their outreach, while not giving
up on the basic principles."1 os
A part of the reorientation is optical: better messaging. But Alston
also recognizes that the human rights movement's attention to the
marginal, vulnerable, and weak has been largely a minoritarian
concern. "From our traditional perspective," he goes on to add, "that is
how it should be . . . But the reality is that the majority in society feel

that they have no stake in the human rights enterprise, and that
human rights groups really are just working for 'asylum seekers,'
felons,' 'terrorists,' and the like."1 0 3 For this reason, "a new human

rights agenda" must be one that "promises to take into account the
concerns, and indeed the human rights, of those who feel badly
done." 10 4 If even the human rights of minorities are hostage to the
human rights-and other interests-of majorities, then not only
principle, but also strategy calls for a more reconciliationist approach.
Alston may disagree about how much those in revolt can sensibly
claim violations of human rights norms and law (since he apparently
believes that they cover distributional fairness in general). But Alston
himself plausibly shames the human rights community and movement
for ignoring inequality for so long. 105 Whoever is correct about whether
human rights norms and law are or are "not enough" to engage the
distributional fairness across its whole curve from poorest to richest,
and from local to global, Alston's refreshing critique of most forms of
human rights politics is most definitely on the right track.
Yet there is a serious lapse in his own argument for reorientation
if its horizon is not ultimately a new democratic politics that
incorporates majority and minority concerns alike. It was this, after
all, that Frankfurter cared most to defend, deferring to majorities to
determine the results. 106 Admittedly, where advocacy, narrowly
defined, should fit within that picture is not the general problem to
think through when it comes to seeking the compatibility of majority
rule with human rights, but rather a specific one, albeit of potentially
enormous importance. But when it comes to that specific problem of
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107
redefining advocacy, Alston speaks wanly of "broadening the base."
The truth is that the critically significant move for human rights
advocates would be to regard themselves first and foremost as
participants in a democratic conversation. Even if it is true that the
democracies in which they operate are barely worthy of the name (as
all democracies so far still are), countermajoritarian devices are hardly
a better alternative. 0 8
Now, it would be easy to dismiss such suggestions for
reorientation as a form of pandering to those who oppose minority
rights, especially to the extent that it is mainly strategic alteration in
109
But no
a storm-as Alston forthrightly admits his own proposal is.
one in the debate about human rights and "populism" is suggesting
that human rights advocacy should sacrifice any principles-any more
than depriving oneself of judicial activists to defend crucial
them
advancing
from
others
exempt
would
entitlements
democratically. Indeed, it is essential to protest against those who have
drawn the lesson from democratic revolt in our moment that it is time
to kowtow, notably in immigration matters.11 0 But it is true that
human rights and the other concerns of majorities matter (especially
to them), and that human rights politics therefore needs to be
reconceptualized in the name of, and therefore as a part of, majority
interests, partly but not only to build coalitions that can win. A vast
reorientation of the human rights enterprise beckons so that, whatever
the defensible autonomy of cause groups, human rights are in the end
not a "cause" apart from democracy but figure within the electoral
alternative and programmatic debate in the contests for majority
support.
Whether on a range of Frankfurterian intrinsic grounds or more
strategic grounds, human rights need to become more democratic in
the name of what Frankfurter called a "persistent positive translation
of the faith of a free society into the convictions and habits and actions
of a community.""' It is likely that, in the long run, this reorientation
will involve much less attention to international forms of human rights
politics without an equal if not greater attention to how supranational
governance can come to fit better with democratic self-government,
with which many forms of international law currently interfere. And it
will involve the reimagination of human rights activism so that it is
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integrally related to democratic practices that are themselves focused
on the acquisition and exercise of majority self-rule-for the sake of
human rights and other relevant values as majorities define and honor
them.

